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Varying environmental conditions affect relations between interacting individuals in social dilemmas, thus
affecting also the evolution of cooperation. Oftentimes these environmental variations are seasonal and can
therefore be mathematically described as periodic changes. Accordingly, we here study how periodic shifts
between different manifestations of social dilemmas affect cooperation. We observe a non-trivial interplay
between the inherent spatiotemporal dynamics that characterizes the spreading of cooperation in a particular
social dilemma type and the frequency of payoff changes. In particular, we show that periodic changes between
two available games with global ordering best be fast, while periodic changes between global and local ordering
games best be slow for cooperation to thrive. We also show that the frequency of periodic changes between two
local ordering social dilemmas is irrelevant, because then the process is fast and simply the average cooperation
level of the two is returned. The structure of the interaction network plays an important role too in that lattices
promote local ordering, whilst random graphs hinder the formation of compact cooperative clusters. Conversely,
for local ordering the regular structure of the interaction network is only marginally relevant as role-separating
checkerboard patterns do not rely on long-range order.
I. INTRODUCTION
When only the fittest survive, cooperation is an unsustain-
able proposition because it entails the sacrifice of individual
fitness for the benefit of others. Yet eusocial insects like ants
and bees are famous for cooperating, even sacrificing their
own reproduction ability to support their communities [1].
Birds are also cooperating, frequently engaging in allomater-
nal behavior to help the offspring of others [2]. Microorgan-
isms cooperate through the sharing of resources and forming
biofilms [3]. Not least humans have been dubbed superco-
operators for our remarkable cooperative drive [4]. Indeed,
cooperation is the basis for the main evolutionary transitions
that led from single cells to multicellular organisms, and to
animal and human societies [5], and it remains a grand chal-
lenge across the social and natural sciences [6–14].
Research in evolutionary game theory [15–19] has revealed
now famous and thoroughly established mechanisms that can
explain cooperation. They are kin selection [20], direct and
indirect reciprocity [21, 22], network reciprocity [23], and
group selection [24], as reviewed in [25]. During the last
decade, methods of statistical physics and network science
[26–29] have been successfully integrated into the mainstream
research concerning the evolution of cooperation, revealing
that the structure of the interaction network can be crucial
[30–44]. It has also been thoroughly established that hetero-
geneity in general, for example in the form of heterogeneous
networks, noisy payoff disturbances, or other individual prop-
erties like the teaching activity or the mobility to connect to
additional other players, strongly promotes cooperation [45–
58].
Heterogeneity may also manifest in varying environmental
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conditions, which alter the relations among interacting indi-
viduals [59–61]. The latter primarily affects payoffs, and it is
often a realistic assumption that the environment, and hence
the payoff values that describe the collective relations of play-
ers and their environment, change periodically. This is com-
monly referred to as seasonal effects. Evidently, if the peri-
odic length of such effects is long enough then the population
will converge to the solution that is related to actually applied
payoff values over a sufficiently long period of time. However,
much more interesting phenomena can be expected if the pe-
riodic length is shorter or comparable to the time scale of the
inherent evolutionary dynamics. The question is whether in
that case we can expect a new type of solution? For exam-
ple, can we observe a cooperation level that is higher than the
simple average of levels obtained for sub-solutions at different
permanent payoff values? An otherwise “inaccessible” state
may emerge when the different time scales interact, or alter-
natively, when frequent mutations trigger the appearance of
such exotic solution [62, 63].
In what follows, we propose a simple mathematical model
that relies on the formalism of evolutionary social dilemmas
(see e.g. [64–66]), where cooperators and defectors play a
game to collect their payoffs and then either retain their strat-
egy or imitate one of their neighbors. Seasonal payoff vari-
ations are introduced simply by means of the periodical ex-
change of two pairs of payoff values, which characterize the
relation of competing strategies. Unlike the majority of re-
search studying the impact of heterogeneity on the evolution
of cooperation, we emphasize that in our case a pair of pay-
off values applies to all the players uniformly as any given
time. Thus, apart from the periodic changes, no additional
heterogeneity is introduced via the seasonal payoff changes.
As we will show, there exists a non-trivial interplay between
the inherent spatiotemporal dynamics that characterizes the
spreading of cooperation in a particular social dilemma type
and the frequency of payoff changes. Depending on whether
the spreading of cooperation is governed by global ordering,
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FIG. 1: Color maps encoding the stationary density of cooperators on the full T − S plane. Top two panels show results obtained on the
square lattice, while the bottom two panels show results obtained on regular random graphs. Moreover, left two panels show results obtained
for the classical version of the game where (T2 = T, S2 = S) are applied permanently, while the right two panels show results obtained
obtained when (T1 = 0.9, S1 = 0.1) and (T2 = T, S2 = S) are exchanged periodically with period τ = 1. In the snowdrift quadrant (SD),
seasonal effects have a very similar impact on cooperation regardless of the applied interaction network. Conversely, in the stag-hunt (SH) and
the prisoner’s dilemma quadrant (PD), cooperators fare better under seasonal variations on the regular lattice than they do on regular random
graphs.
i.e., cooperators survive of spread in compact clusters, or by
local ordering, i.e., cooperators and defectors are typically ar-
ranged in role-separating mixed patterns, either fast or slow
seasonal changes work best to promote cooperation, and the
structure of the interaction network plays an important or rel-
atively marginal role. Only in a special case is the impact of
seasonal payoff variations relatively trivial, but in all cases a
deeper understanding of the different evolutionary outcomes
is attainable by studying in detailed the spatiotemporal dy-
namics and in particular the spreading process of cooperators.
II. RESULTS
A. Mathematical model
We use the social dilemma game formalism as the basis for
our model, where cooperation and defection are the two pos-
sible strategies each player can choose from. The game is
played in a pairwise manner (see Methods for details). If both
players decide to cooperate, they both receive the reward R.
On the other hand, if both players decide to defect, they both
receive the punishment P . If one cooperates while the other
defects, cooperators receives the sucker’s payoff S, while the
defector receives the temptation T . To reduce the dimension-
ality of the parameter space, we setR = 1 and P = 0 as fixed.
In that way, the other two payoffs can have values −1 ≤ S ≤
1 and 0 ≤ T ≤ 2. If T > R > P > S the social dilemma
type is the prisoner’s dilemma game, if T > R > S > P
we have the snowdrift game, R > T > P > S yields the
stag-hunt game, and finally if T < P < S < R the payoff
ranking corresponds to the harmony game (because cooper-
ation always wins in the harmony game, formally this game
is not a social dilemma). During an instance of the game a
player i obtains the payoff Πi in agreement with the above
rules.
To introduce seasonal payoff variations, we periodically ex-
change two pairs of payoff values, (T1, S1) and (T2, S2), after
τ steps. Importantly, whichever pair of payoff values applies
at any given time, it does so for all the players uniformly. This
setup thus differs from previously studied multigames, where
different players in the population can adopt different payoff
values at a particular time [67–69].
Unless stated otherwise, we predominantly use T1 = 0.9
and S1 = 0.1, while T2 = T and S2 = S are free parameters.
In this way we have a cooperation supporting harmony game
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FIG. 2: Stationary density of cooperators ρC in dependence of
T2 = T , as obtained on the square lattice using S2 = 0.5 (left panel,
cutting across the harmony and the snowdrift game) and S2 = −0.5
(right panel, cutting across the stag-hunt and the prisoner’s dilemma
game). The curves represent results obtained for different values of
τ , as indicated in the legend. For comparison, the evolutionary out-
come obtained with the classical version of the game is also shown
(uniform). It can be observed that in the snowdrift game longer pe-
riods results in a higher average cooperation level, while in the stag-
hunt game more frequent seasonal changes have a similarly positive
effect (the same holds for the prisoner’s dilemma game, not shown).
period, while in the other half of the time players play a proper
social dilemma game that is defined by the actual values of T
and S, which are thus the only two free parameters.
B. Evolution of cooperation
In Fig. 1, we show color maps that encode the long-time
average fraction of cooperators, obtained when we apply pe-
riodically changing payoff values using τ = 1 as the periodic
time. The top row shows results obtained on the square lattice,
while the bottom row shows results obtained on regular ran-
dom graphs where each player has the same degree k = 4 as
on the lattice [the same degree is retained to allow a direct and
relevant comparison (cf. [70])]. Moreover, the left two panels
show the stationary fraction of cooperators as obtained when
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FIG. 3: Time evolution of the cooperation level fC in the station-
ary state, as obtained for different values of τ in the snowdrift game
(T = 2, S = 0.5, left panel) and in the stag-hunt game (T = 0.92,
S = −0.5, right panel). The applied values of τ are indicated along-
side the corresponding lines. For a proper comparison we have used
a normalized time scale in 1/τ units. It can be observed that the
relaxation dynamics for the snowdrift game is fast, while for the
harmony game and the stag-hunt game, it is comparatively much
slower. This is due to the fundamentally different spatiotemporal
dynamics, which in the former case is governed by locally ordered
role-separating checkerboard patterns, while in the later case it is
governed by globally ordered compact clusters.
T2 = T and S2 = S are applied permanently, whereas the
right two panels show the stationary fraction of cooperators as
obtained when (T1 = 0.9, S1 = 0.1) and (T2 = T, S2 = S)
are exchanged periodically with period τ = 1. Two generally
valid observations are as follows. Firstly, seasonal effects have
a very similar impact on cooperation in the snowdrift quadrant
(SD) independently of the applied interaction network. Sec-
ondly, in the stag-hunt (SH) and the prisoner’s dilemma (PD)
quadrant, the cooperators fare better on the regular lattice as
they do on regular random graphs. In particular, in the stag-
hunt quadrant the full cooperation state occupies a larger area
of the parameter plane on the regular lattice.
To understand the latter diverse impact of different inter-
action networks for different social dilemmas, we first show
in Fig. 2 a cross section of the T − S plane for the square
4FIG. 4: The propagation of defector fronts in the stag-hunt game, as obtained for T2 = 0.92, S2 = −0.5, and τ = 100. The evolution starts
from a horizontal strip od blue cooperators, marked by white dashed lines. After 200 (left), 400 (middle), and 600 (right) steps the original
strip shrinks gradually because the invasion of defectors during the (T2, S2) period is more effective than the invasion of cooperators during
the (T1 = 0.9, S1 = 0.1) period. We here used L = 400 linear size for clarity, as in the corresponding animations obtained with smaller
values of τ [76–78].
lattice using S = 0.5 (left panel, cutting across the harmony
and the snowdrift game) and S = −0.5 (right panel, cutting
across the stag-hunt and the prisoner’s dilemma game), as ob-
tained for different values of τ . These results reveal that the
application of longer periods helps increasing the cooperation
level in the snowdrift game, while conversely, for the stag-
hunt game the shorter the periods the higher the level of coop-
eration. The same conclusion holds for the prisoner’s dilemma
game, which would be visible if a somewhat less negative
value of S is used (not shown). As we will show in what fol-
lows, these differences are routed in the fundamentally differ-
ent spreading processes that govern the spatiotemporal evolu-
tionary dynamics. In particular, while for the snowdrift game
fast emerging role-separating checkerboard patterns dominate
[71, 72], for the stag-hunt and the prisoner’s dilemma game
cooperation proliferates by means of compact clusters, thus
requiring longer relaxation times due to the need of a globally
ordered state.
In support of this explanation, we show in Fig. 3 the time
dependence of the cooperation level fC for a specific snow-
drift game parameterization, as obtained for different values
of τ . The left panel clearly shows that fC reaches the minimal
value that corresponds to the (T2, S2) payoff pair very fast,
even for relatively small τ values. The maximal fC value,
which would correspond to the (T1, S1) payoff pair, however,
is never reached even if the value of τ is very large. This con-
firms that the role-separating spatially mixed strategy patterns
that characterize the snowdrift game emerge fast, while the
emergence of compact clusters driven by a globally ordered
state in the stag-hunt game takes much longer. Consequently,
the positive impact of the harmony game can only manifest
itself in the average level of cooperation ρC as the period τ
becomes sufficiently long – indeed, the longer the better, as
shown in the left panel of Fig. 2.
The described asymmetric ordering speed can be demon-
strated clearly with animations, where we show the time evo-
lution for τ = 1 [73], τ = 20 [74], and for τ = 100 [75]
by using the same (T2 = 2, S2 = 0.5) pairs. The movies
show that the “mixed”, or role-separating order emerges al-
most immediately for all τ values, while the homogeneous
cooperative (blue) domain can hardly evolve because isolated
defectors prevent reaching the absorbing full C state. The
same argument also explains why we observe very similar be-
havior for regular random graphs in the snowdrift quadrant.
In fact, the role-separating ordering is not hindered by long-
range links, and so the only decisive factor in this case if the
type of the social dilemma, while the topology of the inter-
action network has only marginal importance. At a closer in-
spection, the only inferrable difference in the snowdrift quad-
rant in Fig. 1 between the square lattice and regular random
graphs can be observed for 1.5 < T < 2 and 0 < S < 0.3,
where the level of cooperation is a bit higher in the latter case.
This is because the global ordering that is relevant for the har-
mony game can emerge a bit faster due to the shortcuts, and
thus somewhat raise the average level of cooperation in com-
parison to the square lattice, where the same process unfolds
somewhat slower.
We meet with a qualitatively different outcome in the stag-
hunt quadrant, because here two homogeneous states, namely
full cooperation and full defection represent the permanent so-
lutions of the two periodically alternating payoff pairs. Con-
sequently, both extreme states require global ordering, hence
requiring a kind of coordination of akin players. This explains
why the time evolution of ρC curves is more symmetric in the
right panel of Fig. 3, where we present results for the stag-hunt
game. There is, however, a slight difference between how co-
operator domains and defector domains grow when the actual
payoff values allow their spreading. In particular, the spread-
ing of defectors is more aggressive while the spreading of co-
operators requires more coordination and smooth interfaces.
The resulting difference of invasion speeds becomes visible at
larger values of τ , which ultimately results in a lower average
cooperation level as τ increases, as shown in the right panel
of Fig. 2.
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FIG. 5: Stationary density of cooperators ρC in dependence on the
periodic time τ , obtained when both payoff pairs fall into the snow-
drift quadrant (left panel). We have used (T1 = 1.3, S1 = 0.7)
and (T2 = 1.7, S2 = 0.3), whereby the corresponding ρC values
(if either payoff pair would be applied permanently) are marked by
horizontal dashed lines for comparison. It can be observed that the
ρC value of the game with seasonal variations is more or less exactly
the average of the two games that are alternated, and this regardless
of the value of τ . Only when τ is very small is the relaxation in
both cases not fast enough and so the average diverges towards the
snowdrift game with a slightly faster relaxation [governed by (T1,
S1), more supportive of cooperation, marked by the green dashed
line]. The right panel shows the time evolution of the cooperation
level fC in the stationary state, as obtained for different values of τ
using the same payoff pairs as in the left panel. The applied values
of τ are indicated alongside the corresponding lines. For a proper
comparison we have used a normalized time scale in 1/τ units. It
can be observed that the relaxation dynamics is always (in both pe-
riods) relatively fast, indicative of the fast emerging locally ordered
role-separating checkerboard patterns that govern both instances of
the applied snowdrift game.
For this case we also provide corresponding animations us-
ing τ = 1 [76], τ = 20 [77] and τ = 50 [78], where
(T2 = 0.92, S2 = −0.5) values are used for all cases. To
illustrate the asymmetric invasion speeds more clearly, we
here use alternative prepared initial conditions, where ordered
states are separated by vertical borders. Especially for τ = 50
it can be observed nicely that the bulk of the defector phase re-
mains practically intact while the cooperator phase first falls
apart and then completely dies out. We also show this phe-
nomenon with snapshots in Fig. 4 for τ = 100. The differ-
ence of invasion speeds of defectors and cooperators in the
two governing social dilemmas also explains why the usage
or regular random graphs only modestly supports cooperation
in the stag-hunt quadrant, even if the periodic changes are fast
and the advantages of more effective spreading of defectors
ought to remain hidden. Namely, the random topology hinders
the formation of compact cooperator domains with a smooth
interface, and thus is not supportive of network reciprocity.
At the same time, shortcuts favor the effective invasions of
defectors into the cooperative domains, which taken together
significantly lower the positive consequences of periodically
changing payoff values in this case.
To conclude, we lastly consider the third qualitatively dif-
ferent case when two solutions that are both characterized
by locally ordered states compete in an alternating manner.
This can be reached if both (T1, S1) and (T2, S2) payoff pairs
are from the snowdrift quadrant. Accordingly, we have cho-
sen (T1 = 1.3, S1 = 0.7) and (T2 = 1.7, S2 = 0.3),
where the permanent usage of one of these pairs would yield
ρC = 0.574 and ρC = 0.083 in the stationary state, respec-
tively. The average cooperation level in dependence on τ is
shown in the left panel of Fig. 5. As expected based on the
governing fast spatiotemporal evolutionary dynamics in both
cases, it can be observed that almost irrespective of the value
of τ the cooperation level is simply the average of the co-
operation level in the two alternating snowdrift games. The
validity of this argument is confirmed by the symmetric time
evolution shown in the right panel of Fig. 5 for virtually all τ
values, apart for τ < 25 where a slight breaking of symmetry
occurs. This marginal effect, however, is related to the fact
that the (T1, S1) payoff pair (depicted with the green dashed
line) is closer to the randomly mixed state than the (T2, S2)
payoff pair (depicted with the blue dotted line), and therefore
the relaxation is slightly faster in the former case. To sum up,
only in this particular case do periodic variations in payoffs
amount to the most naive expectation that the final outcome
is a simple average of the two extreme cases obtained under
would-be permanent conditions.
III. DISCUSSION
Motivated by the fact that varying environmental conditions
affect cooperation in social dilemmas, we have studied how
seasonal variations, in particular periodic switching between
two different types of games, affects the evolution of coop-
eration in structured populations. Naively, one could expect
a resulting cooperation level that is simply an average of the
stationary cooperation levels of the two social dilemmas en-
tailed in the switch, but this turns out to be the case only in
one special case. Namely, we have shown that if locally or-
dered states govern the evolution of cooperation, as is the case
in the snowdrift game, then relaxation is fast enough and prac-
tically independent of the structure of the interaction network,
in which case indeed the cooperation level is just a simple av-
6erage of the cooperation levels in the two considered games.
And this is true regardless of the structure of the interaction
network, and regardless of the frequency of payoff variations.
In general, however, we have shown that there exists a
non-trivial interplay between the inherent spatiotemporal dy-
namics that characterizes the spreading of cooperation in a
particular social dilemma type and the frequency of payoff
changes. The inherent spatiotemporal dynamics is affected by
the parametrization of the two games entailed in the switch,
and by the structure of the interaction network. More pre-
cisely, when cooperation proliferates by means of compact
clusters, as is the case in the harmony game, the stag-hunt
game, and the prisoner’s dilemma game, the relaxation times
are longer and the translation invariant feature of an interac-
tion graph promotes the local emergence of a coordinated state
that is necessary for a spreading process to reach a global or-
dering. Accordingly, we have shown that periodic changes
between two games with global ordering should be fast for co-
operation to be promoted, and preferably unfold on a network
without long-range links, like a square lattice. If an interac-
tion network with long-range links is used, like a regular ran-
dom graph, then the irregular structure hinders the formation
of compact clusters, which in turn impairs the evolution of
cooperation. Since the observed behavior is strongly related
to the diverse speed of spreading at different payoff values,
we may expect conceptually similar behavior in scale-free and
multilayer complex networks as well [79–81].
If the seasonal changes trigger global and local ordering
towards particular Nash-equilibrium, for example switching
between the harmony game and the snowdrift game, then we
have shown that it is best for these changes to be slow for
cooperation to be promoted best. This goes on the account of
the harmony game, where the growth of compact cooperative
domains takes time, but is then quickly destroyed by the role-
separating checkerboard patterns that govern the evolutionary
dynamics in the snowdrift game.
Taken together, we have addressed fundamental questions
behind the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas under
seasonal payoff variations. In particular, we have revealed the
delicate interplay between the inherent spatiotemporal game
dynamics and the frequency of seasonal change, and we have
shown when, and under which conditions, new types of so-
lutions can be expected that allow cooperators to survive un-
der adverse conditions or at higher stationary densities. We
hope that our exploration will be useful for further improving
the theoretical understanding of the evolution of cooperation
in social dilemmas, and that it will motivate further research
along these lines.
IV. METHODS
We have studied outcomes of the proposed evolutionary
model on a square lattice of size N = L2 with the von Neu-
mann neighborhood and periodic boundary conditions, and
for comparison on regular random graphs where each player
has the same degree k = 4. The square lattice is the sim-
plest interaction network where the interaction range of each
FIG. 6: We use prepared initial conditions as shown, so that the pop-
ulation cannot evolve into a homogeneous absorbing state during the
first period of τ even under the most adverse conditions. For this to
hold, the linear size of each square should be more than four times
larger than τ . Blue color depicts cooperators (si = C), while the
red color depicts defectors (si = D). Both strategies have equal
occupance of the population at the start of evolution.
player is limited to the four nearest neighbors – a tradition
that is due to Nowak and May [23], which has since emerged
as an often used setup to reveal all relevantly different evolu-
tionary outcomes that are attainable in structured populations
[14]. Similarly, the regular random graph can be considered as
the simplest interaction network with long-range connections,
whilst preserving the degree of each player so that the results
remain comparable to the results obtained on the square lat-
tice. Moreover, by retaining the degree of each player, we
can study specifically the impact of long-range links (or short-
cuts), without introducing further heterogeneity that would
otherwise of course also affect the evolution of cooperation
[45–48, 82, 83].
Due to the application of periodic switching between two
different parameterizations of a social dilemma, it is techni-
cally not irrelevant which parameterization is applied first be-
cause it may be that one strategy dies out before the other
parameterization comes into play. This would be particularly
likely if we launch the evolution from a random state and use a
large τ value (long period between switching) under adverse
conditions for cooperation. To avoid this, we use prepared
initial conditions as shown in Fig. 6, such that the population
cannot evolve into a homogeneous absorbing state during the
first period. This in turn also means that to avoid finite-size
effects we have to apply sufficiently large system sizes that
depend on the actual value of τ . Practically, if the linear size
of an initial domain exceeds twice the value of τ then this do-
main cannot die out during τ steps even if it shrinks at every
iteration step. We note, however, that the prepared initial state
still ensure equal representation of cooperators and defectors
in the population at the start of the evolution.
After the application of prepared initial conditions, we use
the Monte Carlo simulation method with the following three
elementary steps. This is a standard procedure that has been
described in detail many time before, for example in [8]. In
what follows, we repeat the description for completeness of
this paper. Firstly, a randomly selected player i acquires its
payoff Πi by playing the game with all its four neighbors.
Secondly, one randomly chosen neighbor of player i, denoted
by j, also acquires its payoff Πj by playing the game with
7all its four neighbors. Finally, player i adopts the strategy sj
from player j with the probability
W =
1
1 + exp[(Πi −Πj)/K]
, (1)
whereK quantifies the uncertainty by strategy adoptions [84].
In the K → 0 limit, player i copies the strategy of player j
if and only if Πj > Πi. Conversely, in the K → ∞ limit,
payoffs seize to matter and strategies change as per flip of a
coin. Between these two extremes players with a higher pay-
off will be readily imitated, although under-performing strate-
gies may also be adopted, for example due to errors in the
decision making or imperfect information. Without loss of
generality we have here used K = 0.1. We stress, however,
that qualitatively similar behavior can be observed for other fi-
nite values of K . Repeating the above three elementary steps
L2 times constitutes one full Monte Carlo step, which thus
gives a chance to every player to change its strategy once on
average.
Presented results were obtained on square lattices with lin-
ear size ranging from L = 400 to L = 1000, and on regular
random graphs with size ranging from N = 105 to N = 106,
to avoid finite size effects. All simulations were run to obtain
dynamical behavior that is independent on the applied system
size, hence we can exclude finite-size effects.
Acknowledgments
This research was supported by the HungarianNational Re-
search Fund (Grant K-120785) and the Slovenian Research
Agency (Grants J4-9302, J1-9112 and P1-0403).
[1] Wilson, E. O. The Insect Societies (Belknap Press, Cambridge,
MA, 1971).
[2] Skutch, A. F. Helpers among birds. Condor 63, 198–226
(1961).
[3] Nadell, C. D., Xavier, J., and Foster, K. R. The sociobiology of
biofilms. FEMS Microbiol. Rev. 33, 206–224 (2009).
[4] Nowak, M. A. and Highfield, R. SuperCooperators: Altruism,
Evolution, and Why We Need Each Other to Succeed (Free
Press, New York, 2011).
[5] Maynard Smith, J. and Szathma´ry, E. The Major Transitions in
Evolution (W. H. Freeman & Co, Oxford, 1995).
[6] Santos, F. C., Pinheiro, F., Lenaerts, T., and Pacheco, J. M. Role
of diversity in the evolution of cooperation. J. Theor. Biol. 299,
88–96 (2012).
[7] Nowak, M. A. Evolving cooperation. J. Theor. Biol. 299, 1–8
(2012).
[8] Perc, M. and Szolnoki, A. Coevolutionary games – a mini re-
view. BioSystems 99, 109–125 (2010).
[9] Rand, D. G. and Nowak, M. A. Human cooperation. Trends in
Cognitive Sciences 17, 413–425 (2013).
[10] Pacheco, J. M., Vasconcelos, V. V., and Santos, F. C. Climate
change governance, cooperation and self-organization. Physics
of Life Reviews 11, 573–586 (2014).
[11] Fu, F. and Chen, X. Leveraging statistical physics to improve
understanding of cooperation in multiplex networks. New J.
Phys. 19, 071002 (2017).
[12] Chen, X. and Fu, F. Social learning of prescribing behavior can
promote population optimum of antibiotic use. Front. Phys. 6,
139 (2018).
[13] Horita, Y., Takezawa, M., Inukai, K., Kita, T., and Masuda,
N. Reinforcement learning accounts for moody conditional co-
operation behavior: experimental results. Sci. Rep. 7, 39275
(2017).
[14] Perc, M., Jordan, J. J., Rand, D. G., Wang, Z., Boccaletti, S.,
and Szolnoki, A. Statistical physics of human cooperation.
Phys. Rep. 687, 1–51 (2017).
[15] Sigmund, K. Games of Life: Exploration in Ecology, Evolution
and Behavior (Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 1993).
[16] Weibull, J. W. Evolutionary Game Theory (MIT Press, Cam-
bridge, MA, 1995).
[17] Hofbauer, J. and Sigmund, K. Evolutionary Games and Popula-
tion Dynamics (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, U.K.,
1998).
[18] Nowak, M. A. Evolutionary Dynamics (Harvard University
Press, Cambridge, MA, 2006).
[19] Sigmund, K. The Calculus of Selfishness (Princeton University
Press, Princeton, NJ, 2010).
[20] Hamilton, W. D. Genetical evolution of social behavior I & II.
J. Theor. Biol. 7, 1–51 (1964).
[21] Trivers, R. L. The evolution of reciprocal altruism. Q. Rev. Biol.
46, 35–57 (1971).
[22] Axelrod, R. and Hamilton, W. D. The evolution of cooperation.
Science 211, 1390–1396 (1981).
[23] Nowak, M. A. and May, R. M. Evolutionary games and spatial
chaos. Nature 359, 826–829 (1992).
[24] Wilson, D. S. Structured demes and the evolution of group-
advantageous traits. Am. Nat. 111, 157–185 (1977).
[25] Nowak, M. A. Five rules for the evolution of cooperation. Sci-
ence 314, 1560–1563 (2006).
[26] Boccaletti, S., Latora, V., Moreno, Y., Chavez, M., and Hwang,
D. Complex networks: Structure and dynamics. Phys. Rep.
424, 175–308 (2006).
[27] Holme, P. and Sarama¨ki, J. Temporal networks. Phys. Rep. 519,
97–125 (2012).
[28] Kivela¨, M., Arenas, A., Barthelemy, M., Gleeson, J. P., Moreno,
Y., and Porter, M. A. Multilayer networks. J. Complex Netw. 2,
203–271 (2014).
[29] Javarone, M. A. Statistical Physics and Computational Meth-
ods for Evolutionary Game Theory (Springer, Cham, 2018).
[30] Zimmermann, M. G., Eguı´luz, V. M., and San Miguel, M. Co-
evolution of dynamical states and interactions in dynamic net-
works. Phys. Rev. E 69, 065102(R) (2004).
[31] Santos, F. C. and Pacheco, J. M. Scale-free networks provide
a unifying framework for the emergence of cooperation. Phys.
Rev. Lett. 95, 098104 (2005).
[32] Go´mez-Garden˜es, J., Campillo, M., Florı´a, L. M., and Moreno,
Y. Dynamical organization of cooperation in complex net-
works. Phys. Rev. Lett. 98, 108103 (2007).
[33] Fu, F., Wu, T., and Wang, L. Partner switching stabilizes coop-
eration in coevolutionary prisoner’s dilemma. Phys. Rev. E 79,
036101 (2009).
[34] Du, W.-B., Cao, X.-B., Hu, M.-B., and Wang, W.-X. Asym-
8metric cost in snowdrift game on scale-free networks. EPL 87,
60004 (2009).
[35] Go´mez-Garden˜es, J., Vilone, D., and Sa´nchez, A. Disentan-
gling social and group heterogeneities: Public goods games on
complex networks. EPL 95, 68003 (2011).
[36] Ohdaira, T. and Terano, T. Scale-free relationships facilitate
cooperation in spatial games with sequential strategy. Journal
of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation 14(3), 3 (2011).
[37] Wu, Z.-X., Rong, Z., and Chen, M. Z. Q. Diverse roles of the
reduced learning ability of players in the evolution of coopera-
tion. EPL 110, 30002 (2015).
[38] Chen, W., Wu, T., Li, Z., and Wang, L. Friendship-based part-
ner switching promotes cooperation in heterogeneous popula-
tions. Physica A 443, 192–199 (2016).
[39] Liu, P. and Liu, J. Cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma game
on tunable community networks. Physica A 472, 156–163
(2017).
[40] Allen, J. M., Skeldon, A. C., and Hoyle, R. B. Social influence
preserves cooperative strategies in the conditional cooperator
public goods game on a multiplex network. Phys. Rev. E 98,
062305 (2018).
[41] Lee, H.-W., Malik, N., and Mucha, P. J. Evolutionary prisoner’s
dilemma games coevolving on adaptive networks. Journal of
Complex Networks 6, 1–23 (2018).
[42] Yang, H.-X. and Yang, J. Cooperation percolation in spatial
evolutionary games. EPL 124, 60005 (2018).
[43] Fotouhi, B., Momeni, N., Allen, B., and Nowak, M. A. Evo-
lution of cooperation on large networks with community struc-
ture. J. R. Soc. Interface 16, 20180677 (2019).
[44] Liu, D., Huang, C., Dai, Q., and Li, H. Positive correlation
between strategy persistence and teaching ability promotes co-
operation in evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma games. Physica A
520, 267–274 (2019).
[45] Szolnoki, A. and Szabo´, G. Cooperation enhanced by in-
homogeneous activity of teaching for evolutionary prisoner’s
dilemma games. EPL 77, 30004 (2007).
[46] Santos, F. C., Santos, M. D., and Pacheco, J. M. Social diversity
promotes the emergence of cooperation in public goods games.
Nature 454, 213–216 (2008).
[47] Perc, M. and Szolnoki, A. Social diversity and promotion of
cooperation in the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game. Phys. Rev.
E 77, 011904 (2008).
[48] Zhu, C., Sun, S., Wang, L., Ding, S., Wang, J., and Xia, C. Pro-
motion of cooperation due to diversity of players in the spatial
public goods game with increasing neighborhood size. Physica
A 406, 145–154 (2014).
[49] Yuan, W.-J. and Xia, C.-Y. Role of investment heterogeneity
in the cooperation on spatial public goods game. PLoS ONE 9,
e91012 (20141).
[50] Javarone, M. A. Statistical physics of the spatial prisoner’s
dilemma with memory-aware agents. Eur. Phys. J. B 89, 42
(2016).
[51] Javarone, M. A. and Battiston, F. The role of noise in the spatial
public goods game. J. Stat. Mech. 2016, 073404 (2016).
[52] Amaral, M. A. and Javarone, M. A. Heterogeneous update
mechanisms in evolutionary games: Mixing innovative and im-
itative dynamics. Phys. Rev. E 97, 042305 (2018).
[53] Zhang, W., Choi, C., Li, Y., Xu, C., and Hui, P. Co-evolving
prisoner’s dilemma: Performance indicators and analytic ap-
proaches. Physica A 468, 183–194 (2017).
[54] Richter, H. Dynamic landscape models of coevolutionary
games. BioSystems 153-154, 26–44 (2017).
[55] Takesue, H. Evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma games on the
network with punishment and opportunistic partner switching.
EPL 121, 48005 (2018).
[56] Inaba, M. and Takahashi, N. Linkage based on the kandori norm
successfully sustains cooperation in social dilemmas. Games
10, 10 (2019).
[57] Chen, Y.-S., Yang, H.-X., and Guo, W.-Z. Promotion of coop-
eration by payoff-driven migration. Physica A 450, 506–514
(2016).
[58] Cong, R., Zhao, Q., Li, K., and Wang, L. Individual mobility
promotes punishment in evolutionary public goods games. Sci.
Rep. 7, 14015 (2017).
[59] Alonso, J., Ferna´ndez, A., and Fort, H. Prisoner’s dilemma
cellular automata revisited: evolution of cooperation under en-
vironmental pressure. J. Stat. Mech. Theor. Exp. 2006, P06013
(2006).
[60] Ashcroft, P., Altrock, P. M., and Galla, T. Fixation in finite
populations evolving in fluctuating environments. J. R. Soc.
Interface 11, 20140663 (2014).
[61] Szolnoki, A. and Chen, X. Environmental feedback drives co-
operation in spatial social dilemmas. EPL 120, 58001 (2017).
[62] Kotil, S. E. and Vetsigian, K. Emergence of evolutionarily
stable communities through eco-evolutionary tunnelling. Nat.
Ecol. & Evol. 2, 1644–1653 (2018).
[63] Tarnita, C. E. Fast evolution unlocks forbidden communities.
Nat. Ecol. & Evol. 2, 1525–1526 (2018).
[64] Hilbe, C., Schmid, L., Tkadlec, J., Chatterjee, K., and Nowak,
M. A. Indirect reciprocity with private, noisy, and incomplete
information. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 115, 12241–12246
(2018).
[65] Danku, Z., Wang, Z., and Szolnoki, A. Imitate or inno-
vate: Competition of strategy updating attitudes in spatial social
dilemma games. EPL 121, 18002 (2018).
[66] Fu, M., Guo, W., Cheng, L., Huang, S., and Chen, D. History
loyalty-based reward promotes cooperation in the spatial public
goods game. Physica A 525, 1323–1329 (2019).
[67] Hashimoto, K. Multigame effect in finite populations induces
strategy linkage between two games. J. Theor. Biol. 345, 70–77
(2014).
[68] Wang, Z., Szolnoki, A., and Perc, M. Different perceptions of
social dilemmas: Evolutionary multigames in structured popu-
lations. Phys. Rev. E 90, 032813 (2014).
[69] Szolnoki, A. and Perc, M. Coevolutionary success-driven
multigames. EPL 108, 28004 (2014).
[70] Szolnoki, A. and Perc, M. Group-size effects on the evolution
of cooperation in the spatial public goods game. Phys. Rev. E
84, 047102 (2011).
[71] Szabo´, G. and Szolnoki, A. Selfishness, fraternity, and other-
regarding preference in spatial evolutionary games. J. Theor.
Biol. 299, 81–87 (2012).
[72] Amaral, M. A., Perc, M., Wardil, L., Szolnoki, A.,
da Silva Ju´nior, E. J., and da Silva, J. K. Role-separating or-
dering in social dilemmas controlled by topological frustration.
Phys. Rev. E 95, 032307 (2017).
[73] snowdrift τ = 1,
https://dx.doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.8089538
[74] snowdrift τ = 20,
https://dx.doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.8089541
[75] snowdrift τ = 100,
https://dx.doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.8089577
[76] stag-hunt τ = 1,
https://dx.doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.8089610
[77] stag-hunt τ = 20,
https://dx.doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.8089628
[78] stag-hunt τ = 50,
https://dx.doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.8089634
9[79] Wang, Z., Wang, L., Szolnoki, A., and Perc, M. Evolutionary
games on multilayer networks: a colloquium. Eur. Phys. J. B
88, 124 (2015).
[80] Gleeson, J. P., OSullivan, K. P., Ban˜os, R. A., and Moreno, Y.
Effects of network structure, competition and memory time on
social spreading phenomena. Phys. Rev. X 6, 021019 (2016).
[81] de Arruda, G. F., Rodrigues, F. A., and Moreno, Y. Fundamen-
tals of spreading processes in single and multilayer complex
networks. Phys. Rep. 756, 1–59 (2018).
[82] Li, J. and Wang, J. Locality based wealth rule favors coopera-
tion in costly public goods games. Chaos, Solitons and Fractals
116, 1–7 (2018).
[83] Yang, H.-X. and Yang, J. Reputation-based investment strategy
promotes cooperation in public goods games. Physica A 523,
886–893 (2019).
[84] Szabo´, G. and To˝ke, C. Evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game
on a square lattice. Phys. Rev. E 58, 69–73 (1998).
